
3 September 2025
This edition of the Sino-Arabica Policy Monitor surveys diplomatic activity between China and countries of the Mideast from 25 August to 2 September 2025, with special focus on the 25th Annual Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) running from 31 August to 1 September.
Drawing cues primarily from Chinese-language releases issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and regional Chinese embassies, as well as releases from regional news agencies, we have supplemented with context from other official, semi-official, and journalistic sources.
We have also conducted background research in regional languages to verify the identities of non-Chinese interlocutors whose names are rendered only partially or with inexact phonetic approximation in Chinese-language releases.
Table of Contents
- 25th Annual Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
- 7th China-Arab States Expo in Yinchuan, Ningxia
II. Country-specific developments
This edition of the Sino-Arabica Policy Monitor has been prepared by Raphael Angieri and Omnia Musa.
I. Interregional developments
Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit
The 25th annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was held from 31 August to September 2025, in Tianjin, concluding a year in which China chaired the group.
The summit assembled the leaders of the SCO’s 10 member countries, as well as 13 heads of state and government from SCO-affiliated countries, variously classified as “observer states,” “dialogue partners states,” and “guests of the chairing country” from across Eurasia and as far away as Africa.
The SCO was founded in 2001 as a regional coordination body to enhance security cooperation among China, Russia, and four Central Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. India and Pakistan both joined in 2017, while the SCO’s sole Mideastern member country, Iran, joined in 2023. The most recent addition was Belarus in 2024.
Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian attended this year’s summit and, alongside leaders from the nine other member countries, signed the “Tianjin Declaration” issued at its conclusion.
Two other Mideastern leaders attended, representing SCO “dialogue partner states”: President Erdoğan of Türkiye and Prime Minister Madbouly of Egypt. The former country is a member of the US-led military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the latter is the world’s third largest recipient of US military aid as of the fiscal year 2023, after Ukraine and Israel.
Per Chinese MFA readouts, no high-level representatives attended the summit from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries recognized as SCO dialogue partner states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
Leading up to the SCO summit, China Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) officials offered a review of economic relations among members of the organization, plus insight into current priorities.
Vice Minister of Commerce and Deputy China International Trade Representative Ling Ji (凌激) highlighted ‘record-high’ trade volumes within the SCO, at USD 512.4 billion in 2024, or double the volume at the time of the group’s 2018 summit. Ling further noted that, as of July 2025, China’s total stock of investment in other member states had exceeded USD 84 billion, with cooperation expanding from traditional areas such as oil and gas, mining, manufacturing, and infrastructure to emerging fields such as digital economy and green development. Ling emphasized “remarkable results” in connectivity, including smooth operation of pipelines between China-Central Asia and China-Russia, new cross-border highways, and transport along the China-Europe Railway Express.
Implicitly criticizing the Trump administration’s more unilateral approach to trade policy, Director-General of China’s Department of WTO Affairs Han Yong (韩勇) presented the SCO as a vehicle for consensus-driven international commerce:
“Right now, the multilateral trading system faces serious challenges. A few countries have arbitrarily imposed tariffs, blatantly violating WTO rules, undermining members’ legitimate rights and disrupting the global economic and trade order.
“Since assuming the SCO chairmanship [over the period 2024-2025], China has worked actively with other member states to speak out in support of the multilateral system and counter global trade turbulence. This April, the SCO issued a joint statement reaffirming its support for the multilateral trading system, pledging to strengthen it and respond to trade challenges, and endorsing an open, inclusive, sustainable, stable, diversified, and reliable global supply chain.”
In a 1 September keynote speech entitled “Remain True to Our Founding Mission, Create a Better Future,” Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized continuity with the “Shanghai Spirit” of the organization’s founding, i.e., the spirit of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diverse civilizations, and pursuit of common development.”
Xi reviewed SCO accomplishments to date, including 1) security coordination and trust-building, notably multilateral efforts against the “three forces” of terrorism, ethnic separatism, and religious extremism; 2) development cooperation integrating the SCO with the trade, investment, and connectivity aims of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); 3) people-to-people links via media, think tank, youth, women’s, and other non-governmental organizations; 4) a ‘truly multilateral’ vision of global governance based on joint consultation, joint contribution, and joint benefit.
In order to carry forward the “Shanghai Spirit” and fulfill the SCO’s mission of international cooperation “in a world marked by turmoil and transformation,” President Xi called on members to:
- seek common ground while allowing for differences – 求同存异
- pursue mutual benefit and win-win results – 互利共赢
- champion openness and inclusiveness – 开放包容
- uphold fairness and justice – 公平正义
- strive for concrete results and high efficiency – 务实高效
Emphasizing China’s prioritization of “real actions” to ensure better development of the SCO, Xi committed at the end of his address to:
- 100 “small and beautiful” livelihood projects in eligible member states
- RMB 2 billion [USD 280 million] in grants to member states in 2025
- RMB 10 billion [USD 1.4 billions] in loans to SCO Interbank Consortium banks over 3 years
- Doubling of SCO-specific scholarships starting in 2026
- Launch of a doctoral innovation training program
- Establishment of 10 overseas “Luban” vocational centers over five years, providing 10,000 human resource training opportunities
President Xi notably also called for the establishment “as soon as possible” of an SCO development bank, with which “to provide stronger underpinnings for security and economic cooperation among member states.”
In another address directed at the ‘SCO+ Meeting,’ Xi Jinping marked the 80th anniversary of victory in the “World Anti-Fascist War” and the founding of the United Nations by proposing a Global Governance Initiative (GGI) based on the principles of sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, a people-centered approach, and “taking real actions,” with the SCO in particular to “step up to play a leading role and set an example in carrying out the GGI.”
The GGI is the fourth ‘Global Initiative’ to be proposed by Xi, following the Global Development Initiative (2021), Global Security Initiative (2022), and Global Civilization Initiative (2023).
Signed by leaders of the 10 SCO member states, the Tianjin Declaration of 1 September covers a broad agenda of regional cooperation and international coordination, reaffirming shared support for multilateralism, the authority of the United Nations, and the principles of state sovereignty, non-interference, and territorial integrity. It outlines new institutional initiatives across security, economic, and cultural domains while setting strategic priorities for the next decade.
In terms of framing principles, the Tianjin Declaration features the following passage, reminiscent of the older Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, designed in the 1950s for China-India relations and then adapted by China as a framing for relations among post-colonial states more broadly:
“The member states advocate respecting the right of all peoples to independently choose their own paths of political, economic, and social development, and emphasize that mutual respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity; equality and mutual benefit; non-interference in internal affairs; and the non-use or threat of use of force are the foundations for stable and sustained international relations.”
A number of passages in the Declaration relate directly to the Mideast:
- Gaza Crisis and the Israel-Palestine Conflict
“The member states reaffirm their deep concern over the continued escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and strongly condemn actions in the Gaza Strip that have resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties and a humanitarian catastrophe.
“They emphasize the urgent need for a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire, ensuring humanitarian aid access to Gaza, and intensifying efforts to guarantee peace, stability, and security for local populations.
“The member states stress that achieving peace and stability in the Mideast depends on a comprehensive and just resolution of the Palestinian issue.”
- Iran-Israel-US Conflict and UNSC Resolution 2231
“The member states strongly condemn the military aggression carried out by Israel and the United States against Iran in June 2025. Such acts of aggression, including attacks on civilian infrastructure such as nuclear facilities, have resulted in civilian casualties, seriously violated the principles of international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, infringed on Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, undermined regional and international security, and caused grave consequences for global peace and stability.
“They emphasize that nuclear safety and the protection of nuclear facilities must be ensured at all times, including during armed conflict, in order to safeguard civilians and the environment. In this regard, they reaffirm their commitment to resolving the current issues through diplomatic efforts and peaceful means.
“The member states reaffirm the importance and binding nature of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015) and call for its full implementation in accordance with its provisions. Any attempt to arbitrarily reinterpret this resolution undermines the authority of the Security Council.
“The member states call on the relevant parties to resume constructive dialogue and jointly seek solutions to prevent further deterioration of the situation.”
- Support for Iran’s accession to SCO financial mechanisms
“The member states emphasize the important role of the SCO Interbank Consortium, noting that after 20 years of development, it has become a well-regarded mechanism in the financial sector. They support expediting the resolution of the issue of authorizing a bank from the Islamic Republic of Iran to join the Consortium.”
- SCO-Arab League cooperation around energy and climate
“The member states advocate strengthening energy dialogue with SCO partners and support convening a High-Level SCO-Arab League Conference on Climate Change and Sustainable Energy (3 October 2025, Astana).”
According to official readouts of a 27 August 2025 meeting in Cairo, Egypt, between the SCO Deputy Secretary-General, Ahmad Saidmorodzoda (Ахмад Саидмуродзода), and Khaled bin Mohammed Manzlawy (خالد بن محمد منزلاوي), Assistant Secretary-General and Head of Political and International Affairs Sector for the League of Arab States, the two organizations intend through the conference in Astana to work toward implementing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) their two secretariats signed on 15 September 2022 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, with the aim of deepening cooperation in areas of mutual interest including security and stability, health and epidemic preparedness, culture, science, social development, trade, and the economy.
7th China-Arab States Expo
Somewhat overshadowed by the SCO Summit was the opening on 28 August in Yinchuan, Ningxia, of the 7th China-Arab States Expo. MFA Spokesperson Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) offered the following comment on the event:
“Since its establishment in 2013, the China-Arab States Expo has become an important platform for joint Belt and Road cooperation between China and Arab countries. According to available information, this year’s Expo centers on the theme of “Innovation, Green Development, and Prosperity,” and focuses on key areas such as the digital economy, clean energy, artificial intelligence, modern agriculture, water resources, and smart meteorology. It aims to foster a number of cooperative outcomes, reflecting the vibrant momentum of China-Arab economic and trade cooperation. For the first time, the Expo also hosted events related to the China-Arab Interbank Association, “Silk Road E-Commerce,” meteorology, standardization, and intellectual property, injecting new energy into bilateral cooperation.
“Next year, the second China-Arab States Summit will be held in China. China stands ready to work hand in hand with Arab countries to promote the spirit of China-Arab friendship, steadily advance the “Eight Joint Actions” and the “Five Cooperation Frameworks,” open a new chapter of common development, and jointly build a China-Arab community with a shared future.”
Per a China MOFCOM readout, He Wei (何维), Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, delivered a keynote address at the Expo’s opening ceremony, stressing growing alignment between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the long-term development strategies of Arab countries and noting that this strategic coupling has yielded a wealth of practical outcomes.
In a 31 August article featuring footage from the Expo, Xinhua reported:
“According to a press briefing, the Expo attracted over 17,800 participants, resulting in 331 cooperative outcomes (达成合作成果) and letters of intent (意向签约) totaling RMB 107.75 billion [USD 15 billion].
“Key deliverables of this year’s Expo included the release of the “500 China-Arab Advanced Applicable Technology Achievements” and the “Comparative Results of the China-Arab Clean Energy Standards System,” marking the Expo’s transformation from a traditional trade matchmaking platform to a high-level international cooperation platform focused on regulatory alignment, knowledge sharing, and joint mechanism-building.
“This year’s Expo placed stronger emphasis on practical economic and trade cooperation, organizing more than 40 investment promotion events such as business negotiations, industrial matchmaking, and scenario-based investment activities. It produced 331 cooperation outcomes, with 28 projects exceeding RMB 1 billions [USD 140 million], totaling RMB 78.57 billion [USD 11 billion], representing 72.9% of the total value of signed letters of intent.”
II. Country-specific developments
1. SCO Summit Attendees
IRAN
- Pre-summit diplomacy
In advance of the SCO Summit in Tianjin, Chinese Ambassador to Iran Cong Peiwu (丛培武) met on 27 August with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and MFA Spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei (اسماعیل بقایی) for talks in Tehran. According to the Chinese readout, the two sides exchanged views on strengthening mutual understanding and deepening bilateral relations, while Bagheri emphasized that Iran highly values the upcoming SCO Summit in Tianjin and intends to participate actively.
This meeting was followed the next day, on 29 August, by a press conference at which China MFA Spokesperson Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆), criticized the decision by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to submit a formal notification to the UN Security Council to activate the “snapback” sanctions mechanism under Resolution 2231 (discussed in previous edition of the Policy Monitor).
Guo said the Iranian nuclear issue is at a critical juncture and that triggering the snapback mechanism would “undermine the process of resolving the issue through political and diplomatic means.” He emphasized that any action by the Security Council should facilitate a return to negotiations rather than escalate tensions. China, he said, would continue to uphold an “objective and impartial position,” and play a constructive role in bringing the Iranian nuclear issue back to the path of diplomatic resolution as soon as possible.
- Iranian president in Tianjin
Having arrived in Tianjin on 31 August, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian delivered an address the next day at the SCO Summit in which, according to Iranian news agency IRNA, he urged the organization to take “decisive and transparent steps toward fostering global peace and enhancing economic cooperation.”
Stressing the SCO’s role in shaping a multipolar order, Pezeshkian proposed an initiative featuring a special accounts and settlements mechanism aimed at reducing dependence on the US dollar, increased trade in national currencies, and enabling central bank digital currencies and shared digital infrastructure. He also proposed a multilateral currency swap fund to assist members under economic pressure. Pezeshkian condemned recent US and Israeli military actions against Iran and the violence in Gaza as signs of the “failures of the current global governance system,” calling instead for a new model of international cooperation “rooted in justice and mutual respect.”
- Joint China-Russia-Iran letter rejecting E3 triggering of snapback mechanism
In a joint letter signed in Tianjin during the SCO Summit, the foreign ministers of Iran, China, and Russia rejected the E3’s attempt to invoke the “snapback mechanism” against Iran, calling it legally baseless and politically destructive. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (عباس عراقچی), sharing the letter on his X account, argued that the European move undertaken by the UK, France, and Germany lacks any legitimate foundation. He asserted that the sequence of violations must be acknowledged: the U.S. first broke the JCPOA and UNSC Resolution 2231 by withdrawing in 2018, and Europe followed by aligning with unlawful sanctions instead of upholding its commitments.
Araghchi warned that tolerating selective compliance and procedural abuse threatens the entire framework of international agreements and collective security. Asserting that rights and obligations are inseparable under international law, he stated that parties undermining their own commitments cannot invoke benefits of an agreement they have failed to honor, before concluding that the Security Council must not serve as a tool of coercion but rather return to its core mission of safeguarding global peace and stability by restoring the primacy of international law.
EGYPT
- Egyptian PM’s meetings on sidelines of SCO highlight partnership
On 30 August, Egyptian Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly held meetings with President Xi Jinping and Member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Secretariat Cai Qi (蔡奇) in Tianjin, on the sidelines of the 2025 SCO Summit, which Madbouly attended as representative of an SCO “dialogue partner state.”
Xi underscored the historical significance of Egypt as the first Arab and African country to establish ties with the PRC, noting that bilateral relations are at their strongest point to date. He called for both sides to seize the upcoming 70th anniversary of diplomatic ties to advance the construction of a China-Egypt community with a shared future, deepen linkages between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Egypt’s “Vision 2030,” and jointly defend the international order under the UN framework. Cai’s meeting stressed similar themes, emphasizing implementation of the two presidents’ strategic consensus and reaffirming China’s support for elevating cooperation across all sectors.
Madbouly, for his part, reaffirmed Egypt’s commitment to the One-China principle and praised China as a “true partner and friend.” He expressed strong interest in expanding high-level exchanges and cooperation in key sectors such as renewable energy, electric vehicles, finance, and desalination, while also voicing support for China’s major global initiatives. Both sides positioned themselves as aligned Global South actors with a shared stake in resisting unilateralism and safeguarding developing country interests amid global uncertainty. The meetings signaled Egypt’s strategic role in China’s diplomacy heading into a landmark anniversary year for the two countries.
TÜRKIYE
- Chinese ambassador offers Turkish-language interview on trade and development
On 28 August, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs republished an interview with Ambassador Jiang Xuebin (姜学斌) first printed the same day by a local news outlet, stating Beijing’s positions on global trade, economic cooperation, and China-Türkiye relations.
In the interview, Ambassador Jiang reiterated China’s support for WTO-centered multilateralism, defended the country’s market openness and foreign investment policies, and highlighted the resilience and momentum of the Chinese economy amid external uncertainties. He framed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a cornerstone of China’s response to shifting global trade dynamics, citing significant gains in trade and investment with partner countries. On bilateral ties, he underscored the strategic alignment between China’s BRI and Türkiye’s “Middle Corridor” plan, calling for deeper connectivity, trade, financial coordination, and cultural exchange to advance their comprehensive cooperation.
- Xi-Erdogan meeting in Tianjin, on sidelines of SCO Summit
Some of these themes were also raised during a 31 August meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Tianjin, held on the sidelines of the 2025 SCO Summit, in which Türkiye participated as a “dialogue partner state.”
According to the Chinese readout, Xi emphasized the strategic importance of China-Türkiye ties as relations between two emerging powers and key Global South actors, calling for closer alignment of national development strategies, deeper economic and technological cooperation, including in renewable energy, 5G, and biomedicine, and joint efforts to build a fairer global governance system. He proposed closer BRI coordination with Türkiye’s Middle Corridor plan, expanded people-to-people ties, and enhanced multilateral cooperation through the UN, G20, and SCO.
Erdoğan, for his part, reportedly reaffirmed Türkiye’s strong commitment to developing ties with China, emphasizing continued high-level exchanges and expanded cooperation across trade, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and healthcare. He welcomed deeper people-to-people engagement, expressed support for the One-China principle, praised China’s balanced stance on regional affairs, and expressed Türkiye’s willingness to enhance its coordination with China within the SCO’s framework to promote regional stability and global development.
2. Non-SCO Summit Attendees
IRAQ
On August 25, Chinese Ambassador to Iraq Cui Wei (崔巍) delivered a keynote address at a commemorative forum at Sulaimaniyah University marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. According to a release from the Chinese Consulate in Erbil, the event was co-hosted with local officials including Kurdistan Region Vice President Jaafar Sheikh Mustafa (جعفر شيخ مصطفى), Governor of Sulaimaniyah Haval Abubakir (هفال أبو بكر), and over 600 participants.
Cui underscored China’s historical role as the Eastern front of WWII and reiterated the importance of learning from history to preserve peace, combat unilateralism, and prevent historical revisionism.
Cui also used the occasion to highlight the 10th anniversary of the China-Iraq strategic partnership and Belt and Road cooperation, praising the contributions of Chinese firms to Kurdistan’s development. He welcomed growing local enthusiasm for Chinese language and academic research, as seen through initiatives like the China Studies Center at Sulaimaniyah University. The event included parallel sessions on historical memory and modernization, as well as a WWII photo exhibition. Consul General Liu Jun (刘军) closed the forum, reinforcing China’s support for peace and multilateral development.
On August 26, China’s Assistant Foreign Minister Hong Lei (洪磊) met with Iraq’s newly appointed ambassador to China, Ahmad Tahsin Berwari (أحمد تحسين برواري), who presented a copy of his credentials. Berwari arrived in Beijing a day earlier to begin his diplomatic mission.
SAUDI ARABIA
On August 26, Chinese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chang Hua (常华) met with Abdulaziz Hamad Aluwaisheg (عبدالعزيز حمد العويشق), the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Assistant Secretary-General for Negotiations and Political Affairs. The two discussed expanding strategic cooperation within the China-GCC partnership, including follow-up on the first China-GCC Summit and the China-GCC-ASEAN meetings. According to the Chinese readout, both sides emphasized enhancing political trust and deepening engagement on regional and multilateral issues.
On the same day, in Beijing, Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao (王文涛) met with Khalid Al-Falih (خالد الفالح), Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Investment.
The two discussed advancing bilateral cooperation on trade, investment, and industrial supply chains. Wang noted 2025 marks the 35th anniversary of diplomatic ties and emphasized aligning China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Al-Falih reiterated Saudi Arabia’s support for expanding two-way investment, particularly in advanced manufacturing, energy, and industrial zones, and affirmed support for multilateral trade systems.
YEMEN
The Chinese MFA published on 28 August 2025 a Chinese-language transcript of an interview with Chargé d’affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Yemen Shao Zheng (邵峥) which had been aired in Arabic on 16 August by Yemen’s Aden TV, offering insight into Beijing’s diplomatic efforts, development agenda, and stated position on the ongoing conflict in Yemen.
Shao outlined China’s longstanding commitment to Yemen, including humanitarian aid during the pandemic, development cooperation, and education. He expressed hope for reactivating China’s embassy and consulate once conditions allow, and emphasized that China sees Yemen as a key partner in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), noting China’s past projects and future investment interests. He also confirmed Beijing’s support for Yemeni sovereignty and a political solution to the conflict, while rejecting military options and criticizing Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.
Shao also touched on China’s zero-tariff policy for least-developed countries, which he said could boost Yemeni exports like honey and coffee. He highlighted China’s educational outreach, with over 6,500 Yemeni students studying in China, and affirmed support for media, cultural, and business exchanges.
Finally, rejecting reports of Chinese arms sales to the Houthis and emphasizing Beijing’s adherence to UN export controls, Shao reaffirmed China’s neutrality and commitment to Red Sea security through naval patrols. He nonetheless stressed that China has not designated the Houthis as a terrorist group, instead urging all parties back to negotiations.
On August 28, Shao published an op-ed titled “History is a Mirror for the Present and Future” (历史之镜映照现实与未来) in Alyemen Al Ethadi (اليمن الاتحادي), a Yemeni media outlet. The article marked the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII, calling for a globally informed and ‘just view of history’ while reaffirming Beijing’s position on sovereignty, particularly over Taiwan.
Shao also commemorated 69 years of diplomatic relations with Yemen, pledging deeper cooperation under the BRI and Global Development Initiative as stability in Yemen improves.


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