March – April 2026
This edition of the Sino-Arabica Policy Monitor surveys China’s Mideast-facing policy from 17 March to 9 April 2026, picking up from Policy Monitor #8.
The period covers the second phase of Beijing’s response to the US-Israel-Iran war, from the conclusion of Special Envoy Zhai Jun’s Gulf shuttle diplomacy on 17 March through the issuance of the “Five-Point Initiative on Restoring Peace and Stability in the Gulf and Mideast Region“ on 31 March, its embassy-level rollout, and China’s response to the fragile ceasefire brokered on 7 April with Pakistani mediation.
Overall, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi conducted more than two dozen publicized phone calls with counterparts over the full period since the start of the war on 28 February. On 30 March, China confirmed the transit of Chinese ships through the Strait of Hormuz, marking the first officially confirmed Chinese commercial passage since the blockade began. At the United Nations Security Council, Permanent Representative Fu Cong offered China’s reasoning for its 7 April veto of the Bahrain-drafted resolution that would encourage states to coordinate defensive efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz—which China argued would provide legal cover for unauthorized military action—at the same time affirming that China “does not agree with Iran’s attacks on Gulf Cooperation Council countries“ (中方不认同伊朗对海合会国家的攻击).
Pakistan and China emerged as operational partners in diplomacy aimed at reaching a ceasefire. Pakistani Foreign Minister Mohammed Ishaq Dar visited the Chinese capital within a week of Islamabad’s Beijing-endorsed offer to host US-Iran talks and weekend consultations with Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia; his visit was framed explicitly as coordination vis-à-vis the Iran situation, and provided an occasion for the issuance of the China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative leading up to the ceasefire. Official Chinese statements have deflected on any direct role in the Islamabad negotiations beyond the already publicized diplomatic coordination, despite media reports to the contrary.
Downstream from these high-level diplomatic signals, Chinese embassies and consulates across more than a dozen countries in the Mideast and beyond deployed coordinated messaging on the war through op-eds, media briefings, and bilateral meetings integrated into its routine Mideastern diplomacy.
Table of Contents
– Timeline of China’s Response to the Iran War
– Gulf: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen
– Greater Levant: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Turkey
– North Africa: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia
I. High-Level Signals
Timeline of China’s Response to the Iran War
17 March: Concluding a flurry of regional shuttle diplomacy which had begun a week-plus earlier with a trip to Saudi Arabia, Special Envoy to the Mideast Zhai Jun (翟隽) holds talks in Cairo with Egyptian FM Badr Abdelatty (بدر عبد العاطي) and Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit (أحمد أبو الغيط).
In the former meeting, Egyptian FM Abdelatty reportedly states that “Iran must stop its attacks on Arab countries,” and also that the war “should not divert the international community’s attention from the Palestinian issue.” Zhai’s publicized response does not directly address Abdelatty’s condemnation of Iran’s behavior, instead submitting that further spread of war will impact “regional economic development and global energy security,” and that “the urgent priority is to immediately achieve a ceasefire and stop the war.“ Zhai Jun agrees with FM Abdelatty that the Palestinian issue ”must never again be ignored or forgotten,“ stressing its centrality to the broader security dynamics of the Mideast and affirming China’s support for a two-state solution.
Also on 17 March, Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit emphasizes in his meeting with Zhai Jun that Iran must “stop attacking Gulf Arab countries, ensure the security and smooth passage of the Strait of Hormuz, and avoid disrupting international trade and regional oil exports,” urging China to take “creative measures” (创造性举措) to achieve a ceasefire. Zhai Jun responds that China “supports the legitimate demands of Arab countries” again without specifying the question of Iran’s attacks on the Gulf Arab countries, and pledges “unremitting efforts” alongside the Arab League.
18 March: Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) grants a meeting in Beijing to UAE Presidential Special Envoy for China Affairs Khaldoon Al Mubarak (خلدون المبارك), thus becoming the highest-ranked Chinese official to publicly receive a Mideast interlocutor since the start of the Iran war. Ding states China is “willing to make positive contributions to the early restoration of peace and stability in the Gulf region;” Al Mubarak remarks that the UAE “looks forward to China playing a greater role in promoting regional peace.“
The same day, also in Beijing, Chinese FM Wang Yi also holds talks with UAE Special Envoy Al Mubarak, stating that “the strategic significance of China-UAE relations has become more prominent” amid the crisis and that timely strategic communication is “conducive to promoting peace and stability in the Mideast at an early date.” Regarding the war: “This war should not have happened, and there is no need to continue fighting” (这场战争本不该发生，更没必要再打下去); “China firmly supports the UAE in safeguarding its sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, condemns attacks against civilians and civilian facilities;” Al Mubarak reportedly describes China as “a reliable and trustworthy true friend” (可依靠、可信赖的真正朋友).
19 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Lin Jian (林剑) responds to news that Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani (علی لاریجانی) had been killed in an Israeli attack, and to Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz (ישראל כ״ץ)’s statement authorizing the Israeli military to kill any Iranian official without need for special approval. Lin Jian states that China is shocked by the remark and reiterates opposition to the use of force in international relations. “The killing of Iranian leaders and attacks on civilian targets are by no means acceptable;” urges parties to “prevent the regional situation from becoming uncontrollable.”
Lin Jian also provides a summary of Zhai Jun’s shuttle diplomacy to date: meetings with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Egypt; the GCC and Arab League secretaries-general; a phone call with Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Outlines the message of this diplomatic push: “promoting peace and ending the war is the fundamental way out”; GCC sovereignty “should be fully respected, non-military targets should not be attacked, and navigation safety should not be disturbed.“
Responding to news that China has assured the Philippines it would not restrict fertilizer exports amidst war-related shortages, and that China-Philippines talks were underway regarding energy security, Lin Jian declines to respond directly to the fertilizer question but emphasizes that China “stands ready to strengthen coordination and collaboration with Southeast Asian countries and jointly address energy security issues.”
20 March: Chinese Special Envoy Zhai Jun meets Iranian Ambassador to China Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli (عبدالرضا رحمانی فضلی) in Beijing; a laconic Chinese MFA readout of the occasion notes that the two sides exchanged views on the current tense regional situation.
20 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Lin Jian notes that “Mideast conflicts are still escalating and warfare is still expanding,” directly affecting “international energy, finance, trade and shipping.” Calls on the parties involved to “press the ‘stop button’ on military actions” (按下军事行动“停止键”). Regarding US Treasury Secretary Bessent’s statement that the US might lift sanctions on Iranian oil already in transit, Lin Jian comments that “China has always opposed illegal unilateral sanctions,” emphasizing that “all parties have the responsibility to keep energy supply stable and unimpeded.”
23 March: Special Envoy Zhai Jun participates in a special briefing for Chinese and foreign media hosted by the China Public Diplomacy Association (中国公共外交协会); articulates a three-tier formulation: “ceasefire and cessation of hostilities is the urgent priority” (停火止战是当务之急); “dialogue and negotiation are the path to breaking the deadlock” (对话谈判是破局之路); “returning to the proper track of observing international law is the fundamental solution” (回到遵守国际法和国际关系基本准则的正轨是治本之策). Also reportedly takes questions on overseas Chinese citizen protection and international energy security.
23 March: At a press briefing, Lin Jian responds to a question on Trump’s 48-hour ultimatum to Iran demanding restoration of Strait of Hormuz passage or destruction of power plants: “If the fighting continues to expand […] the entire region will fall into an uncontrollable situation […] Force will only lead to a vicious cycle.” Asked whether China has specifically requested Iran to ensure safe passage for Chinese ships and oil, Lin Jian deflects, reiterating China’s call for all parties to stop military actions.
24 March: Special Envoy Zhai Jun meets Israeli Ambassador to China Eliav “Eli” Belotsercovsky (אליאב בלוצרקובסקי); the Chinese readout notes the two sides exchanged views on the tense regional situation.
24 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Lin Jian responds to Trump’s announcement that he will postpone strikes on Iranian power facilities for five days to make room for negotiations: “Prolonged warfare serves no party’s interests; ceasefire and dialogue is the only way out.“
24 March: Chinese FM Wang Yi speaks by phone with Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi (عباس عراقچی) at the latter’s request. Araghchi thanks China for emergency humanitarian aid, states that “the Iranian people are united in resisting external aggression,” and that “Iran is committed to achieving a comprehensive ceasefire rather than just a temporary one.” On the Strait of Hormuz: “open to all, and ships can pass safely, but countries currently at war are not under consideration“—a formulation the MFA readout reproduces without comment. Wang reiterates China’s position: ”All hotspot issues should be resolved through dialogue and negotiation rather than the use of force. Talking is always better than fighting.“ Urges parties to ”seize every peaceful opportunity and window“ to start peace negotiations.
25 March: Special Envoy Zhai Jun meets collectively with GCC ambassadors to China, commenting at the gathering that China “attaches importance to the GCC’s reasonable security concerns.” The qualifier “reasonable” (合理) is notable, implicitly distinguishing among GCC demands rather than endorsing them wholesale. Zhai Jun “supports the efforts of GCC countries to maintain their sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.” The assembled GCC ambassadors express hope China will “play a greater role in promoting early restoration of regional peace and stability.”
25 March: FM Wang Yi speaks by phone with Turkish FM Hakan Fidan at the latter’s request. Wang states: “The rights and wrongs of the Mideast conflict are very clear” (中东战事的是非曲直十分清楚); supports Turkey in “playing a constructive role in promoting the resumption of negotiations.” Fidan states that “Turkey’s position is highly consistent with China’s,“ in that both oppose military attacks without UN Security Council authorization and oppose further spillover of the war.
25 March: FM Wang Yi speaks by phone with Egyptian FM Badr Abdelatty at the latter’s request. Abdelatty warns that “if energy and power facilities are attacked and paralyzed, it would lead the entire region into chaos.” Wang responds: “The Mideast situation is changing rapidly, with both the United States and Iran releasing negotiation-related signals–a glimmer of hope for peace.” Supports Egypt’s continued mediation role.
In the same phone call, Wang states that “the Security Council’s actions should help ease the situation and promote dialogue […] rather than providing a green light for the use of force“ (不能给使用武力开通行证)—language directed at the Bahrain-drafted UNSC resolution, first circulated on 21 March on behalf of the GCC and Jordan, which reportedly sought to authorize measures to secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
25 March: At a press briefing, Lin Jian is asked twice about China’s position regarding transit through the Strait of Hormuz in light of Iran’s statement that “non-hostile vessels” could benefit from safe passage “in coordination with the competent Iranian authorities,” as well as a reported 22 March letter to the same effect from Iran’s Foreign Ministry to the UNSC. Asked directly whether any Chinese ships have transited, Lin does not confirm or deny. On Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt offering to mediate, with Islamabad proposed as venue, Lin Jian stresses that “China supports all efforts conducive to easing tensions, deescalating the situation and restoring dialogue.”
26 March: Special Envoy Zhai Jun meets Russian Ambassador to China Igor Morgulov (Игорь Моргулов); Zhai states that “as both China and Russia are permanent members of the UNSC and both support ceasefire,” they “should join hands to defend international fairness and justice.” Morgulov notes that Russia is “willing to strengthen communication and coordination with China” to promote a ceasefire.
26 March: At a press briefing, Lin Jian responds to questions about whether China is pushing for talks between US and Iran: “All parties should work in the same direction to create conditions for launching truly meaningful and sincere peace talks” (各方都应同向而行，为开启真正有意义、有诚意的和谈创造条件).
27 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Lin Jian responds to allegations that China’s largest chipmaker SMIC (中芯国际) has supplied chip manufacturing tools to Iran’s military: “I’m not aware of what you mentioned. I would just like to say that lately we have seen certain media outlets churning out dubious news, which turned out to be false after verification.”
27 March: At the request of Iran, China, and Cuba, the 61st session of the UN Human Rights Council holds an urgent debate regarding the attack on Shajareh Tayyebeh girls’ elementary school in Minab, Iran, with China’s Permanent Representative to UN Geneva Jia Guide (贾桂德) stating that the attack “deprived 168 young schoolgirls of their precious lives” and “collapsed the bottom line of human moral conscience” (突破人类道德良知底线). Identifies the root cause: “The United States and Israel launched attacks on Iran without UN Security Council authorization.” Calls on all parties to “seize all peaceful opportunities and windows” and “initiate the peace process with a sincere attitude.”
30 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning (毛宁) comments on Pakistan proposing to host US-Iran talks in Islamabad after weekend consultations with Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia: “We appreciate Pakistan’s efforts… [and] support Pakistan’s continued role as mediator.” On the G7 foreign ministers’ statement urging cessation of attacks on civilians but not mentioning a ceasefire: “Military means cannot solve fundamental problems.” On Trump saying he might “soon reach an agreement” with Iran while not ruling out strikes on power plants, calls on all parties to “show sincerity.”
31 March: At a press briefing, Mao Ning confirms Pakistani Deputy PM and FM Mohammed Ishaq Dar (محمد اسحاق ڈار) is arriving for his second Beijing visit in three months; states that Chinese and Pakistani foreign ministers will “step up strategic communication and coordination on the situation in Iran.“ On damage to Iranian historical sites and monuments since 28 February: “It is truly sad and regrettable to see how the war is damaging Iran’s cultural relics and historical sites.” On US-Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, and US drills to seize enriched uranium by force: “Armed attacks against peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards violate the purposes of the UN Charter, international law and the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute“ and ”deal a heavy blow to the authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.“
At the same press briefing, after weeks of ambiguity on Chinese ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, Mao Ning comments on reports citing ship-tracking data of two Hong Kong-flagged COSCO container vessels exiting the Persian Gulf via the Larak Island corridor on 30 March after what ship-tracking data and media reports indicate was a failed attempt three days earlier. Mao Ning confirms: “After coordination with relevant parties, three Chinese ships recently transited the Strait of Hormuz. We express our thanks to the relevant parties for their assistance.“ The third vessel has been identified in Chinese media as a bulk carrier; all three had been stranded in the Gulf for over a month.
31 March: FM Wang Yi holds talks in Beijing with Pakistani Deputy PM and FM Mohammed Ishaq Dar. After the meeting, China and Pakistan issue the “Five-Point Initiative on Restoring Peace and Stability in the Gulf and Mideast Region” (关于恢复海湾和中东地区和平稳定的五点倡议): (1) immediately cease hostilities, with humanitarian relief allowed into all war-affected areas; (2) start peace talks as soon as possible, with sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran and Gulf countries maintained, and parties committing not to use or threaten force during negotiations; (3) ensure safety of non-military targets, with full compliance with international humanitarian law and cessation of attacks on energy, desalination, electricity, and peaceful nuclear facilities; (4) ensure safety of shipping lanes, with protection of stranded ships and crew and restoration of normal navigation through the Strait of Hormuz; (5) ensure the primacy of the UN Charter, with agreements on a comprehensive peace framework based on international law.
1 April: At a press briefing, Mao Ning summarizes the Five-Point Initiative as “one, Stop; two, Talk; three Guarantees” (一停二谈三确保). Describes the initiative as “open” and welcomes “responses and participation from all countries and international organizations.” Notes that “the Iranian conflict has continued for one month.” Characterizes China and Pakistan as “important countries of the Global South… voicing rational and just calls” (理性、正义呼声). Asked by the BBC about the likelihood of the US and Israel heeding the initiative, Mao Ning responds with language about overcoming difficulties and creating opportunities for peace.
2 April: FM Wang Yi speaks by phone with Bahraini FM Abdullatif Al Zayani (عبداللطيف الزياني) at the latter’s request. Al Zayani, who the previous day assumed the UNSC rotating presidency for April, comments that “navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is obstructed” and that Bahrain “is willing to play a role through the UNSC” to resolve the issue, a reference to the Bahrain-drafted UNSC resolution on behalf of the GCC and Jordan, seeking to authorize defensive measures to reopen the strait. Wang cites the China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative (issued two days earlier) and states that “the UNSC’s actions should help ease tensions and resume dialogue, rather than endorsing illegal acts of war or adding fuel to the fire“ (不能为违法战争行为背书，更不能火上浇油), underscoring China’s opposition to any Security Council endorsement of the use of force.
The same day, FM Wang Yi speaks by phone with Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud (فيصل بن فرحان آل سعود) at the latter’s request. Wang Yi states: “The Iranian conflict has dragged on for over a month, causing enormous casualties and losses.” On Hormuz: “Without stopping the conflict, the strait cannot be secure.” On the UNSC: “Its actions must avoid escalating confrontation and cannot legitimize unauthorized military actions, otherwise there will be endless consequences, with small and medium-sized countries bearing the brunt“—a framing that positions China as advocate for smaller states against great-power collateral damage.
2 April: At a press briefing, Mao Ning responds to Trump’s statement that strikes will continue for another two to three weeks and that the US would hit Iran’s energy facilities if Iran does not negotiate: “Military means cannot fundamentally resolve the issue.” On Trump’s statements directing countries that obtain oil through the Strait of Hormuz to “go to the Strait, and just TAKE IT“: ”The root cause of the obstruction of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is the illegal military actions by the US and Israel against Iran.“ On reported attacks against Iranian universities and professors targeted for assassination: ”Attacks on schools seriously violate international humanitarian law.“ On a planned British-hosted international conference on re-opening the Strait of Hormuz: “China is willing to continue playing a constructive role.” Deflects on questions about Chinese participation in Hormuz escort operations and whether Iran has requested Chinese security guarantees for a ceasefire.
2 April: At back-to-back UNSC open debates on UN cooperation with the Arab League and the GCC, Permanent Representative Fu Cong delivers two statements. In the Arab League debate, Fu Cong reiterates China’s position that “this is a war that should not have happened“ and that ”the only way out is a political solution.“ Supports UN-Arab League cooperation, calls for the UNSC to ”heed Arab League opinions“ and ”support resolving regional problems through regional means.“ In the GCC debate, Fu Cong calls the GCC “the most dynamic regional organization in the Mideast,” while stressing that “the origin of this war is the military attack launched by the United States and Israel against Iran, which clearly violates the UN Charter [….] The key to preventing deterioration lies in the US and Israel stopping military actions.“ Reiterates that “China does not agree with Iran’s attacks on GCC countries” (中方不认同伊朗对海合会国家的攻击) and “condemns all indiscriminate attacks on civilians and non-military targets,” even as he sharpens China’s opposition to the Bahrain-drafted Hormuz resolution: “Under current circumstances, authorizing member states to use force amounts to legitimizing the unlawful and indiscriminate use of force, and will inevitably lead to further escalation and serious consequences.” Introduces the China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative.
3 April: At a press briefing, Mao Ning responds to US President Trump posting a video of the US destroying an Iranian civilian-use bridge: “The US and Israel’s military actions against Iran were not authorized by the UNSC and violate international law. China opposes attacks on civilian facilities.“
5 April: FM Wang Yi speaks by phone with Russian FM Sergei Lavrov (Сергей Лавров) at the latter’s request. Lavrov states that Russia is “highly concerned about the continued escalation” and that on the war and the Strait of Hormuz, “military actions must be stopped immediately“ and the root causes of the conflict addressed; the UNSC ”should play a constructive role.“ Wang responds that ”China and Russia, as permanent members of the Security Council, should uphold justice on matters of principle“ (应在大是大非问题上体现公道) and ”adopt objective and balanced approaches.“ Frames the Hormuz issue as derivative: “The fundamental solution to the Strait of Hormuz navigation problem is achieving a ceasefire as soon as possible” (解决霍尔木兹海峡通航问题的根本是尽快停火止战).
7 April: Special Envoy Zhai Jun meets French Ambassador to China Bertrand Lortholary at the latter’s request. Lortholary states that France is “deeply concerned” about regional escalation and its negative impact on the global economy, and that the China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative “is relatively aligned with France’s position” (同法方立场较为契合). Zhai responds that “China and France, both permanent members of the UNSC, should uphold justice, join hands to promote peace and stop the war, and support the parties in returning to the correct track of dialogue and negotiation.”
7 April: At a press briefing, Mao Ning provides a comprehensive accounting of China’s diplomatic activity since 28 February: Wang Yi has conducted 26 phone calls with counterparts, Zhai Jun has shuttled through the region, and the Five-Point Initiative has been issued with Pakistan. Asked about Trump’s deadline of 8 pm that evening for Iran to agree to a ceasefire deal or face total destruction, Mao responds that “prolonged warfare and escalating conflict do not serve any party’s interests.” Asked directly about the Bahrain draft UNSC resolution and whether a vote would take place that day, Mao Ning reiterates China’s position that Security Council action should ease tensions rather than endorse unauthorized military action—language consistent with Wang Yi’s 2 April formulations. On Reuters’s question about Iran rejecting a US ceasefire proposal conveyed via Pakistan: “China welcomes all efforts conducive to peace” and “hopes relevant parties seize the opportunity for peace.”
7 April: In an explanatory statement after the Security Council vote on the Bahrain-drafted Hormuz resolution, Permanent Representative Fu Cong announces that China has voted against the resolution, exercising its veto alongside Russia, despite the resolution having narrowed through successive drafts from explicit force authorization to language encouraging states to coordinate defensive efforts, before a final diluted version dropped any explicit authorization of force. Fu argues the draft nonetheless “failed to comprehensively and objectively reflect the root causes and full picture of the conflict” and that provisions on condemnation, threat characterization, and armed escort “are highly susceptible to misinterpretation and even abuse.” Invokes the precedent of Libya and the Red Sea: “The Security Council’s lessons are still fresh in memory; we must never repeat the same mistakes.” Reiterates the dual-track formulation: “China strongly calls on the United States and Israel to immediately stop their illegal war actions against Iran“ while simultaneously calling on Iran to “stop attacking facilities of Gulf countries, take into account the reasonable concerns of Gulf countries, and focus on the common interests of the Global South.“ Announces that Russia and China have jointly proposed an alternative Security Council draft resolution on the Hormuz issue, describing it as “committed to easing tensions, calling for dialogue and negotiations, and safeguarding navigation rights and freedoms.”
8 April: At a press briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning welcomes a reported US-Iran ceasefire arrangement: “China welcomes the ceasefire arrangement announced by relevant parties and supports the mediation efforts made by Pakistan and other countries.“ Asked whether Trump’s claim that China ”pushed Iran to negotiate“ is accurate, Mao Ning responds with standard references to China’s 26 phone calls, shuttle diplomacy, and Five-Point Initiative, neither confirming nor denying additional Chinese actions to broker the deal. On the Security Council veto: “The fundamental cause of obstructed navigation in the Strait of Hormuz is the illegal military actions by the United States and Israel against Iran”; the Sino-Russian draft has been formally distributed to Council members. On reports that Iran plans to charge transit fees through Hormuz with revenue shared with Oman, neither endorses nor rejects the proposal: “Maintaining security, stability, and smooth passage in this region serves the common interests of the international community.” Asked about China importing sanctioned Iranian oil via “shadow fleets” and “teapot” refineries: “China has always firmly opposed illegal unilateral sanctions that lack basis in international law and are not authorized by the UN Security Council,” a non-denial that reframes the question as one of sanctions legitimacy. Deflects on whether China has made specific demands to Iran, on whether China would provide security guarantees, and on whether China would send ships to the region.
9 April: At a press briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning responds to large-scale Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon the previous day, reported to have killed 254 and injured over 1,100—over which Iran reportedly closed the Strait of Hormuz again in response, claiming the strikes violated ceasefire arrangements: “Lebanon’s sovereignty and security should not be violated, and the lives and property security of civilians must be guaranteed.” Asked to confirm White House reports that the US held talks with China regarding the Iran war, Mao Ning confirms only that “China has maintained communication with all parties.“ Asked about Pakistani officials’ reported claim that China served as a guarantor in Iran negotiations, promising that Iranian officials would not be assassinated during future talks, Mao Ning deflects: ”China will continue to make efforts to ease tensions and quell the fighting.“ On Trump’s threatened 50 percent tariff on countries supplying weapons to Iran: “There are no winners in tariff wars.”
Beyond Iran: Syria, Palestine, Lebanon
While the Iran war dominated China’s high-level Mideast diplomacy during this period, Beijing also maintained active positioning on Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon.
Syria. At a 18 March UNSC open meeting on Syria, Permanent Representative Fu Cong delivers a three-point statement: On political transition, Fu welcomes “positive changes” in the northeast and measures by the transitional government to implement a comprehensive integration agreement, reaffirming the “Syrian-led, Syrian-owned” principle and urging the UN Special Envoy to Syria office to relocate to Damascus as soon as possible; On counterterrorism, Fu warns that “regional developments may provide new space for terrorist forces entrenched in Syria to expand,” citing recent attacks and the continued presence of foreign terrorist fighters, and calls on the transitional government to “take all effective measures to resolutely combat all UNSC-listed international terrorist organizations, including East Turkestan Islamist Movement (ETIM)“; On the humanitarian front, Fu notes 16.5 million in need of aid and 7.1 million facing food insecurity; calls on “traditional donors” to increase assistance and “relevant countries” to lift unilateral sanctions. In closing, pivots to a regional framing: “The entire Mideast is being pushed toward a dangerous abyss” (整个中东局势正在被推向危险的深渊).
Palestine. On 19 March, Temporary Chargé d’Affaires Li Xin (李鑫) publishes in Palestinian outlet Al-Quds, highlighting FM Wang Yi’s commitment that China will “continue to support Palestine’s just cause for legitimate national rights.” On 24 March, Permanent Representative to UN Geneva Jia Guide addresses the the worsening situation in Palestine during the Human Rights Council’s 61st session, citing the Israeli plan to annex 82 percent of the West Bank, settlement expansion displacing over 36,000 Palestinians in the past year, and an “unprecedented” humanitarian crisis in Gaza; Ambassador Jia emphasizes that “humanitarian access must be restored, a lasting ceasefire in Gaza must be achieved, settlement activity must be curbed, the two-state solution must be implemented, and Israel should immediately withdraw from Lebanese and Syrian territory.“ On 25 March, Permanent Representative Fu Cong delivers a three-point statement at a UNSC open debate on Palestine: (1) end the suffering of Gaza civilians, citing over 600 killed since the ceasefire agreement; (2) halt illegal settlement activity in the West Bank; and (3) advance the two-state solution with full UN membership for Palestine.
Lebanon. On 27 March, Ambassador Chen Chuandong (陈传东) meets Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (نبيه بري), briefing on China’s mediation efforts and humanitarian assistance and reaffirming support for Lebanese sovereignty. Berri thanks China for “upholding justice and providing help in times of need.” In separate press briefings on 30 and 31 March, spokesperson Mao Ning condemns attacks on UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, where one peacekeeper was killed and another seriously injured on 30 March, followed by two peacekeepers killed the following day. “Any deliberate attack on UN peacekeepers seriously violates international humanitarian law and UNSC Resolution 1701.”
Embassy-Level Messaging Rollout
In parallel to the high-level diplomacy tracked above, Chinese embassies and consulates conducted a broad, coordinated messaging campaign on the Iran war through op-eds, media briefings, public addresses, and bilateral meetings. The campaign ran from mid-March through early April across several dozen countries worldwide, mobilizing through three formats: regional media placements, Two Sessions briefings, and the post-31 March rollout of the Five-Point Initiative.
Regional media campaign. Ambassadors and consuls in the Gulf and broader Mideast have published op-eds and signed articles in local-language media carrying specific, quotable Iran war language, including condemnation of US-Israeli strikes as violations of international law, calls for immediate ceasefire and political settlement, and respect for GCC sovereignty. In Kuwait, the ambassador emphasizes Chinese condemnation of indiscriminate attacks. In Yemen, the chargé d’affaires writes that “having a hard fist does not equal having sound reasoning.” Outlets in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Iraq (Erbil) carry similar pieces, the last a trilingual op-ed in Kurdish media advocating regional strategic autonomy. The consul general in Dubai publishes twice in two days, first in Gulf Times (30 March) then in Gulf News (31 March), the latter stating that “the world cannot retreat to the law of the jungle.” In Turkey, Ambassador Jiang Xuebin conducts a media saturation campaign across at least three outlets between 13 and 20 March, including through the Turkish Press Association, Ekonomi Gazetesi, and Milliyet.
Two Sessions briefings. More than a dozen Chinese embassies used Two Sessions and 15th Five-Year Plan briefings as occasions to deliver Mideast messaging. At a Ramadan gathering for Algerian scholars, former ministers, and media, the Chinese ambassador called the war one that “should not have happened” and flagged an upcoming China-Arab States Summit to be held in China; an Egypt address to 80 government and Arab League representatives called for “restoring order to the Middle East, tranquility to the people, and peace to the world.” Outside the region, the ambassador in the United Kingdom told 400 attendees at the China-UK Trade Forum that “the United States and Israel launched military attacks on Iran without UN authorization, clearly violating international law.” The ambassador in Mauritius wrote in Le Mauricien that “from the first day of the Middle East war, China clearly called for ceasefire.” Elsewhere, MFA readouts from briefings in Cuba, Germany, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Slovakia, Indonesia, Botswana, Iceland, and Thailand (Songkhla) note that the ambassador or consul general “responded to questions on the Middle East situation” without reporting specific language.
Five-Point Initiative rollout. Within 48 hours of the 31 March issuance of the China-Pakistan Five-Point Initiative, at least five embassies and consulates incorporated it into scheduled engagements. In Pakistan, the ambassador met a senior Islamic leader to pledge continued coordination; the consul general in Lahore presented the initiative to provincial investment officials. In Algeria, the ambassador described it to the veterans affairs minister as “an open and transparent initiative that conforms to the common aspirations of the international community.” In Liberia, the initiative was introduced to maritime regulators alongside the 15th Five-Year Plan. In Kenya, the ambassador told 30 journalists and scholars it was “the international community’s first systematic policy proposition regarding the restoration of peace and stability in the Gulf and Middle East region.” In South Africa, Ambassador Wu Peng gave a live television interview on SABC’s “Agenda” program (3 April, aired 5 April) and subsequently addressed the founding ceremony of the China-South Africa Media Club (7 April), both times promoting the Five-Point Initiative and urging Global South solidarity. In the region itself, the ambassador in Saudi Arabia gave Al Sharq Al Awsat an interview organized around the “one, Stop; two, Talk, three, Guarantees” formula. The consul general in Dubai described the initiative to Gulf Today as “concrete, systematic, and open.” The ambassador in Jordan walked through all five points for Al-Nabataean. And in Somalia, an op-ed titled “China: A ‘Source of Stability’ and ‘Positive Energy’ in a Turbulent World” paired the initiative with a presentation of the zero-tariff announcement for 53 African countries.
II. Diplomatic Activity Log
The following tables capture bilateral and routine diplomatic engagements between Chinese and Mideastern or Mideast-based officials, organized by region.
1. Perso-Arabian Gulf
| Date | 🇨🇳 ▾ | ● ▾ | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 16 Mar | 🇸🇦 | Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chang Hua (常华) visits overseas Chinese representatives amid escalating regional tensions to provide official reassurance; quotes Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅)’s recent statement that “the world before you is full of chaos, but the motherland behind you is as stable as Mount Tai.” | |
| 16 Mar | 🇸🇦 | Acting Consul General in Jeddah Su Yongbin (苏勇彬) publishes in Saudi media outlets Swift Electronic Daily and Langchao News Network promoting China’s National People’s Congress achievements; highlights China’s five-year economic growth averaging 5.4% and emphasizes China-Saudi cooperation prospects under the Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Vision 2030 alignment. | |
| 23 Mar | 🇾🇪 | Chargé d’Affaires to Yemen Shao Zheng (邵峥) meets Oil Minister Advisor Khalid Mahfoudh Bahah (خالد محفوظ بحاح) in Riyadh. Shao states that “ceasefire and ending hostilities is the urgent priority” amid regional tensions, while Bahah expresses hope for greater Chinese role in achieving regional peace and stability. | |
| 23 Mar | 🇰🇼 | Ambassador to Kuwait Yang Xin (杨欣) publishes in multiple major outlets marking 55 years of China-Kuwait diplomatic relations. Yang highlights bilateral trade reaching $18.58 billion in 2025 and China’s 11-year standing position as Kuwait’s top trading partner. | |
| 25 Mar | 🇾🇪 | Chargé d’Affaires to Yemen Shao Zheng (邵峥) meets Minister of Electricity and Energy Adnan Al-Kaf (عدنان الكاف) to discuss bilateral relations amid regional tensions, with Al-Kaf describing China as “a trustworthy partner.” | |
| 25 Mar | 🇦🇪 | Ambassador to the UAE Zeng Jixin (曾继新) calls on Federal National Council Speaker Saqr Ghobash (صقر غباش) upon taking office. Zeng emphasizes deepening legislative cooperation and development strategy alignment under leadership of President Xi Jinping (习近平) and President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (محمد بن زايد آل نهيان). | |
| 25 Mar | 🇸🇦 | Consul General in Jeddah Yang Yi (杨易) arrives to assume his new post and meets Counselor Saleh I. Alqasoumi (صالح بن ابراهيم القسومي) from the Saudi Foreign Ministry’s Mecca branch. | |
| 26 Mar | 🇾🇪 | Chargé d’Affaires to Yemen Shao Zheng (邵峥) video calls with Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Afrah Abdulaziz Al-Zouba (أفراح عبد العزيز الزوبة). Shao expresses China’s willingness to continue humanitarian and reconstruction assistance while supporting Yemen’s peace process. | |
| 27 Mar | 🇾🇪 | Chargé d’Affaires to Yemen Shao Zheng (邵峥) meets Minister of Oil and Minerals Mohammed Abdullah Ali Bamaqa (محمد عبدالله بامقاء) in Riyadh; Shao reiterates China’s principled position on Yemen and pledges continued humanitarian assistance while Bamaqa praises China’s “objective and fair position.” | |
| 30 Mar | 🇷🇺🇸🇦 | Consul General in Yekaterinburg Luo Shixiong (罗世雄) publishes article in Expert-Ural magazine debunking “China overcapacity theory;” cites China’s steel exports exceeding 100 million tons in 2025, with exports to Saudi Arabia growing 24.5%, as evidence that Chinese capacity meets real global demand. | |
| 30 Mar | 🇸🇦 | Consul General in Jeddah Yang Yi (杨易) attends the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce business connection event and meets President Mohammed Yousuf Naghi (محمد يوسف ناغي); Naghi states that “China is Saudi Arabia’s most important economic and trade cooperation partner.” | |
| 1 Apr | 🇸🇦 | Consul General in Jeddah Yang Yi (杨易) presents letter of credentials to Saudi Arabia Deputy Director General of the Mecca Branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Qutub (أحمد القطب). |
2. Greater Levant
| Date | 🇨🇳 ▾ | ● ▾ | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 16 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets Al-Rai Editor-in-Chief Khalid Al-Shogran (خالد الشقران); Guo praises the newspaper’s influential China reporting and proposes strengthened media cooperation, while Al-Shogran expresses interest in learning from China’s digital media transformation experience. | |
| 17 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) calls for regional ceasefire during Ramadan and discusses China’s poverty elimination experience as a model for developing countries in exclusive interview with Um Ali Foundation (تكية أم علي). | |
| 17 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets former Minister of Education Ibrahim Badran (إبراهيم بدران) to discuss bilateral educational cooperation including Chinese language instruction and academic credential mutual recognition. | |
| 18 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) announces China’s emergency humanitarian assistance to Jordan and three other countries amid the Middle East conflict in exclusive interview to Jordan’s National News Agency. Guo affirms China’s support for regional countries’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. | |
| 18 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets former Deputy Prime Minister Jawad Anani (جواد العناني). Guo notes the upcoming Second China-Arab Summit offers new opportunities for the China-Jordan strategic partnership. | |
| 19 Mar | 🇱🇧 | Ambassador to Lebanon Chen Chuandong (陈传东) visits the China-funded Lebanon National Higher Music Academy construction site with Development and Reconstruction Committee Chairman Mohamed-Ali Kabbani (محمد علي قباني). | |
| 23 Mar | 🇱🇧 | Ambassador to Lebanon Chen Chuandong (陈传东) meets International Organization for Migration (IOM) Country Representative Matthew Luciano to coordinate humanitarian assistance for Lebanese refugees and displaced persons. | |
| 24 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) attends the 58th anniversary commemoration of the Battle of Karameh alongside Minister of Culture Mustafa Al-Rawashdeh (مصطفى الروّاشدة). | |
| 24 Mar | 🇯🇴🇹🇷 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets Turkish Ambassador to Jordan Yakup Çamazoğlu, stating China is willing to push the situation back onto the track of political settlement; Çamazoğlu expresses Turkey’s willingness to cooperate with China in cooling down the situation. | |
| 25 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets Chairman of Jordan’s Senate Tourism and Antiquities Committee Michel Nazzal (ميشيل نزال) to discuss bilateral tourism cooperation and direct flights. | |
| 25 Mar | 🇱🇧 | Ambassador to Lebanon Chen Chuandong (陈传东) inspects displaced persons resettlement site in Saida with UNHCR Representative Bilin, visiting a project partially funded by China’s Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund. | |
| 26 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets United Nations UNICEF Representative to Jordan Mark Rubin to discuss cooperation on regional child development. | |
| 30 Mar | 🇲🇹🇹🇷 | Ambassador to Malta Zhang Zuo (张佐) meets new Turkish Ambassador to Malta Barkın Kayaoğlu; Zhang highlights China-Turkey ties spanning millennia through the Silk Road and proposes third-country cooperation as Global South members. | |
| 30 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets United Nations OCHA Regional Representative for the Middle East and North Africa Séverine Rey; Guo praises OCHA’s role in addressing humanitarian crises and expresses China’s willingness to strengthen cooperation to alleviate regional humanitarian difficulties. | |
| 30 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets Former Prime Minister Omar Razzaz (عمر الرزاز); Guo thanks Razzaz for his contributions to China-Jordan relations. | |
| 30 Mar | 🇱🇧 | Ambassador to Lebanon Chen Chuandong (陈传东) meets Internal Security Forces Director General Hassan Choucair (حسن شقير); Chen expresses China’s firm support for Lebanese security and thanks the ISF for protecting Chinese citizens and institutions amid regional tensions. | |
| 31 Mar | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) delivers keynote speech on “China’s 15th Five-Year Plan and China-Jordan Joint Building of Modernization” at the Jordan International Affairs Association, attended by Former Prime Minister Adnan Badran (عدنان بدران) and over 60 Jordanian officials and scholars. Responds to questions on China’s position on Middle East issues. | |
| 1 Apr | 🇯🇴 | Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets Al-Dustour Editor-in-Chief Yanal Barmawi (يانال البرماوي) to discuss strengthened media cooperation. | |
| 2 Apr | 🇹🇷 | Ambassador to Turkey Jiang Xuebin (姜学斌) publishes signed article in Turkish mainstream media Morning News praising First Lady Emine Erdoğan’s Zero Waste initiative and calling for enhanced China-Turkey cooperation in new energy and green development. |
3. North Africa
| Date | 🇨🇳 ▾ | ● ▾ | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| 18 Mar | 🇩🇿 | Ambassador to Algeria Dong Guangli (董广利) leads a delegation to inspect Algiers Port, accompanied by Port Authority Director Abdelhamid Boualam (عبد الحميد بوالعام). Dong emphasizes the port’s role as an important link for Chinese-Algerian connectivity under the Belt and Road Initiative. | |
| 18 Mar | 🇱🇾 | Ambassador to Libya Ma Xuliang (马旭亮) meets UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily, reaffirming China’s support for “Libyan-led, Libyan-owned” principles. | |
| 19 Mar | 🇲🇦 | Ambassador to Morocco Yu Jinsong (余劲松) addresses over twenty Chinese-funded enterprises at embassy working meeting, emphasizing compliance operations and safety standards. | |
| 19 Mar | 🇲🇦 | Ambassador to Morocco Yu Jinsong (余劲松) visits the China Cultural Center in Rabat with Executive Director Hu Yali (胡娅丽). | |
| 23 Mar | 🇩🇯 | Ambassador to Djibouti Hu Bin (胡斌) accompanies President Ismail Omar Guelleh (إسماعيل عمر جيله) to unveil Chinese-aided 500-unit social housing project. | |
| 23 Mar | 🇩🇿 | Ambassador to Algeria Dong Guangli (董广利) inspects the Chinese-funded Youth Cultural Palace project site. | |
| 23 Mar | 🇹🇳 | Ambassador to Tunisia Wan Li (万黎) meets Secretary of State Mohamed Ben Ayed (محمد بن عياد) and delivers President Xi Jinping (习近平)’s congratulatory message to President Kais Saied (قيس سعيد) on Tunisia’s National Day. Both sides discuss the Second China-Arab Summit. | |
| 24 Mar | 🇲🇦 | Ambassador to Morocco Yu Jinsong (余劲松) conducts research visit to Moulay Messaoud Group in Meknes, inspecting olive groves and processing facilities; Yu states President Xi’s zero-tariff measures for African countries will deepen China-Morocco agricultural cooperation. | |
| 25 Mar | 🇩🇿 | Ambassador to Algeria Dong Guangli (董广利) meets National Gendarmerie Commander Major General Sid Ahmed Berrumana (سيد أحمد بورمانة) to discuss law enforcement cooperation and protection of overseas Chinese institutions and citizens. | |
| 26 Mar | 🇩🇿 | Ambassador to Algeria Dong Guangli (董广利) and Algeria-China Friendship Association Chairman Smail Debeche (إسماعيل دبش) jointly host China-Algeria Youth Dialogue during the China-Africa Year of Humanistic Exchange. | |
| 26 Mar | 🇱🇾 | Ambassador to Libya Ma Xuliang (马旭亮) calls on the Government of National Unity Interior Minister Emad Trabelsi (عماد الطرابلسي) upon taking office to discuss public security cooperation and Chinese personnel safety. | |
| 31 Mar | 🇱🇾 | Ambassador to Libya Ma Xuliang (马旭亮) meets Minister of Housing and Construction Issam Al-Tamouni (عصام التموني) in inaugural visit; highlights China’s 15th Five-Year Plan and Belt and Road opportunities. | |
| 31 Mar | 🇱🇾 | Ambassador to Libya Ma Xuliang (马旭亮) meets ministerial-level official presiding over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Taher al-Baour (طاهر الباعور) to exchange views on bilateral and multilateral cooperation. | |
| 1 Apr | 🇱🇾 | Ambassador to Libya Ma Xuliang (马旭亮) meets Minister of Planning Mohamed Al-Zaidani (محمد الزيداني) to propose deeper development cooperation; Al-Zaidani welcomes Chinese enterprise participation in Libya’s reconstruction. | |
| 2 Apr | 🇩🇿 | Ambassador to Algeria Dong Guangli (董广利) addresses Algerian students returning from an “Experiencing China” cultural exchange program, emphasizing that youth exchanges form the foundation of China-Arab friendship. | |
| 2 Apr | 🇩🇿 | Ambassador to Algeria Dong Guangli (董广利) attends “Crossing Mountains and Seas, Youth Walking Together” China-Algeria Youth Exchange Activity with over 50 Algerian youth study tour participants and embassy young diplomats. | |
| 5 Apr | 🇩🇿 | Ambassador to Algeria Dong Guangli (董广利) leads over 100 Chinese embassy staff, enterprise representatives, medical team members, and overseas Chinese in tomb sweeping activities at Algiers’ Alia National Cemetery; the ceremony honors more than 300 deceased Chinese compatriots including diplomats, medical personnel, and enterprise employees who died serving China’s diplomatic, economic and people-to-people missions in Algeria. |
This edition of the Sino-Arabica Policy Monitor has been prepared by Raphael Angieri, Omnia Musa, and Margaret Wu.
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