Sino-Arabica Policy Monitor #8 // China Responds to the Iran War

Two men in formal attire seated on a light-colored sofa, engaged in conversation against a backdrop of light curtains.

February – March 2026

This edition of the Sino-Arabica Policy Monitor surveys China’s Mideast-facing diplomatic activity from 28 February to 17 March 2026.

The period is dominated by Beijing’s response to the US-Israeli military strikes on Iran, which began on 28 February and triggered a remarkable mobilization of Chinese diplomacy toward the region, including a dozen phone calls by Foreign Minister Wang Yi with regional and global counterparts, shuttle diplomacy by Special Envoy Zhai Jun across the Gulf, five Security Council interventions by Permanent Representative to the UN Fu Cong, a statement by Permanent Representative to the IAEA Li Song condemning strikes on nuclear facilities, and the evacuation of over 10,000 Chinese citizens from the conflict zone. In a 8 March intervention at China’s Two Sessions, FM Wang Yi articulated five principles for handling the crisis, insisting on national sovereignty as the basis of international affairs and stressing that “the world cannot retreat to the law of the jungle” (世界不能退回丛林法则).

Routine diplomatic activity meanwhile continued at high tempo, with Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei conducting 18 engagements in 16 days and Chinese embassies across North Africa amplifying China’s zero-tariff trade policy for 53 African countries ahead of a planned 1 May implementation under the China-Africa Economic Partnership Agreements (CAEPA).

Table of Contents

I. High-level Signals: Iran, Palestine, Global Governance

Timeline of China’s Response to the Iran War

Palestine and the Mideast in China’s Vision of Global Governance

II. Diplomatic Activity Log

Gulf: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen

Greater Levant: Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Turkey

North Africa: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia

I. High-level Signals: Iran, Palestine, Global Governance

Timeline of China’s Response to the Iran War

28 February: An MFA spokesperson issues the first official Chinese statement on reported US-Israeli strikes in Iran, expressing “high concern” (高度关切), calling for Iran’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity to be respected, and for “an immediate cessation of military actions, avoiding further escalation of tensions, restoring dialogue and negotiations, and maintaining peace and stability in the Mideast region.”

28 February: At an emergency UN Security Council session, Permanent Representative Fu Cong (傅聪) condemns the strikes, stating that “the United States and Israel brazenly launched military strikes within Iranian territory” and that “force is not the correct way to resolve international disputes.” Notes with alarm that “the relevant military strikes occurred while the US and Iran were conducting diplomatic negotiations.” Calls for immediate cessation of military operations and return to political settlement.

1 March: An MFA spokesperson condemns the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (سید علی حسینی خامنه‌ای), calling it “a serious violation of Iran’s sovereignty and security, trampling on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and basic norms of international relations;” China “firmly opposes and strongly condemns” the killing.

2 March: Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) speaks by phone with Iranian FM Abbas Araghchi (عباس عراقچی), who tells Wang Yi that “the United States launched a second war against Iran during US-Iran negotiations” despite the fact that “both sides had made positive progress in this round of negotiations.” Wang Yi affirms “China cherishes the traditional China-Iran friendship” and “supports Iran in defending its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and national dignity.” Urges Iran to “maintain national and social stability, pay attention to reasonable concerns of neighboring countries, and safeguard the safety of Chinese citizens and institutions.”

2 March: Wang Yi speaks by phone with Omani FM Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi (بدر بن حمد البوسعيدي). Badr reports that under Oman’s mediation, “Iran-US negotiations achieved unprecedented progress” before the US and Israel “abandoned existing negotiation results and launched a war.” Wang Yi states that “the urgent priority is to immediately stop military actions, prevent the further spillover of war, and avoid the situation sliding toward a point of no return” (无可挽回的地步). Tells Gulf countries to “strengthen independence and autonomy, oppose foreign interference” and “truly take their future and destiny into their own hands.”

2 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning (毛宁) states that strikes “without UN Security Council authorization” violate international law. Expresses China’s “deep concern about the spillover of warfare affecting neighboring countries” including Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Jordan. Confirms one Chinese citizen killed in Tehran and over 3,000 evacuated from Iran. On the Strait of Hormuz closure by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), says the waterway is “important” for international trade and “maintaining security and stability in this region serves the common interests of the international community.” Denies reports of a CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missile deal with Iran: “the report is not true.”

2 March: At a special International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors meeting, Permanent Representative Li Song (李松) condemns strikes on “Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards supervision,” stating it is “unacceptable for the United States and Israel to launch attacks during the Iran-US negotiation process, and unacceptable to openly assassinate the leader of a sovereign state and incite regime change.” Calls on the international community to “send a clear and unambiguous voice in opposition to the world regressing to the law of the jungle” (反对世界倒退回丛林法则).

3 March: Wang Yi speaks by phone with Israeli FM Gideon Sa’ar (גדעון סער) at the latter’s request. Wang Yi states that “over the years, China has been committed to promoting a political solution to the Iran nuclear issue” and that “recent Iran-US negotiations had been making clear progress toward addressing Israel’s security concerns. Unfortunately, this process has been interrupted by gunfire.” Tells Sa’ar that “the true value of military strength lies not on the battlefield, but in preventing war” (军事实力的真正价值不在战场,而在于预防战争). Demands Israel “take concrete measures to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and institutions.”

3 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning summarizes Wang Yi’s phone calls with Russia, Iran, France, and Oman, articulating China’s three-point position: “First, immediately cease military operations; second, return to dialogue and negotiations as soon as possible; third, jointly oppose unilateral actions.” States that “great powers cannot rely on military superiority to attack other countries at will (大国不能凭借军事优势任意攻击他国), and the world cannot regress to the law of the jungle.” Confirms IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi‘s statement that “the IAEA has not seen a systematic nuclear weapons manufacturing plan by Iran.” Urges respect for sovereignty and protecting civilian lives, warns of conflict spillover in response to a question regarding Israeli strikes on Lebanon and on an Iranian girls’ elementary school.

4 March: Wang Yi speaks by phone with UAE Deputy PM and FM Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (عبد الله بن زايد آل نهيان), who states that “the UAE is not a party to the war, has not participated in this conflict, and should not be subject to illegal attacks.” Wang Yi responds that “war spillover serves no party’s interests” and that “the red line of protecting civilians in conflicts must not be crossed, non-military targets such as energy, economic, and livelihood facilities should not be attacked, and navigation safety must be maintained.” Announces China will dispatch to the region its Special Envoy for Mideast Affairs to conduct mediation (斡旋).

4 March: Wang Yi speaks by phone with Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud (فيصل بن فرحان آل سعود). Faisal reports that “the conflict is still spreading with a trend toward further expansion” and that “Saudi Arabia has maintained restraint but also reserves the right to self-defense.” Wang Yi states that reconciliation among regional countries is hard-won and precious (实现和解难能可贵)—an apparent reference to Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran normalization—and that it is “worthy of cherishing and continued advancement.”

4 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning provides detailed evacuation guidance listing passable border crossings out of Iran: Astara (Azerbaijan), Agarak (Armenia), Van/Ağrı/Hakkâri (Turkey), Shalamche (Iraq), and Bajgiran (Turkmenistan). Reports over 470 Chinese citizens evacuated since the outbreak of hostilities. On the IRGC’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, declines to confirm Iranian reports that passage is restricted to all vessels except Chinese and Russian.

5 March: At a press briefing, Mao Ning announces that Wang Yi has now spoken with foreign ministers of Russia, Iran, Oman, France, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Confirms China will send Special Envoy Zhai Jun (翟隽) to the Mideast “in the near future” to “encourage peace and avert war” (劝和阻战). Pressed by Spain’s EFE news agency on timeline and scope of authorization, Mao Ning declines to elaborate.

5 March: Vice Foreign Minister Miao Deyu (苗得雨) visits the Iranian Embassy in Beijing to pay condolences for the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei.

6 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Mao Ning is asked whether China is providing military or dual-use material assistance to Iran after the Iranian FM stated that “Russia and China are providing political and other support.” Mao Ning responds that China “supports Iran in defending its sovereignty” and “has consistently advocated resolving issues through political and diplomatic means,” neither confirming nor denying material support. On reports that China is pressing Iran to ensure safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz for oil tankers and Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers, says only that “maintaining security and stability in this region serves the common interests of the international community.” Reports progress on repatriation: a flight carrying nearly 300 Chinese citizens departed Dubai for Guangzhou on March 4, with Air China, China Eastern, China Southern, and Hainan Airlines resuming routes to the UAE, Oman, and Saudi Arabia from March 5.

8 March: Chinese FM Wang Yi delivers his major Two Sessions press conference statement on the Iran situation, titled “Stop fighting, end the war, and restore peace to the Mideast and the rest of the world” (停火止战,还中东和世界以和平). Opens by referencing a classical Chinese proverb drawn from the Hanfeizi: “Weapons are instruments of ill omen, and must not be used without the utmost deliberation” (兵者,凶器也,不可不审用). Outlines five principles for handling Iran and related Mideast issues: (1) respecting national sovereignty—”sovereignty is the cornerstone of the current international order”; (2) not abusing force—”solid fists are not the same as solid reasoning (拳头硬不等于道理硬); the world cannot retreat to the law of the jungle”; (3) non-interference in internal affairs—”planning color revolutions and engineering regime change do not enjoy popular support” (策划颜色革命、搞政权更迭不得人心); (4) political resolution of hotspot issues; (5) great powers playing a constructive role and using their strength with goodwill. To hammer in the last point, Wang Yi references another classical Chinese work, relating the downfall of China’s tyrannical Qin dynasty: “Whosever exercises power without righteousness will find his own aggressions turned against him.” (仁义不施,而攻守之势异也).

8 March: Special Envoy Zhai Jun begins shuttle diplomacy in Saudi Arabia, first meeting with Saudi FM Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud. Faisal states that “the Mideast region is experiencing an unprecedented crisis, with warfare spreading to Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia, seriously threatening regional stability and affecting global energy supply and shipping security.” Zhai Jun responds that “promoting peace and ending war is the fundamental way out of the current predicament” (促和止战是走出当前困局的根本出路).

8 March: Zhai Jun meets GCC Secretary-General Jassim Al-Budaiwi (جاسم البديوي) in Riyadh. Al-Budaiwi states that “escalation of tensions in the Gulf region seriously threatens global security and stability.” Zhai Jun expresses “appreciation for the GCC Special Foreign Ministerial Meeting’s emphasis that dialogue and diplomacy are the only way to overcome the current crisis.”

9 March: Wang Yi speaks by phone with Kuwaiti FM Sheikh Jarrah Al-Sabah (جراح جابر الصباح), who reports that “Kuwait is not a party to the war but is still impacted by the conflict” and that Gulf countries “will not abandon their legitimate right to self-defense.” Wang Yi reiterates that “the United States and Israel launched military attacks against Iran without UN authorization while US-Iran negotiations were still ongoing, which clearly violates international law.”

9 March: Wang Yi speaks by phone with Bahraini FM Abdullatif Al Zayani (عبداللطيف الزياني), who states that “Bahrain has always been peace-loving and should not be subjected to illegal attacks.” Wang Yi offers a three-tier formulation: “The urgent task is to immediately stop military actions… The path to breaking the deadlock lies in quickly returning to dialogue and negotiation… The fundamental solution is to jointly return to the proper track of observing international law.” Confirms Special Envoy Zhai Jun will visit Bahrain.

9 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Guo Jiakun (郭嘉昆) comments on Iran appointing Mojtaba Khamenei (مجتبی خامنه‌ای) as new Supreme Leader, noting, “This is a decision made by Iran based on its constitution.” On G7 discussions about releasing emergency oil reserves: “Energy security is crucial to the world economy, and all parties have the responsibility to ensure stable and smooth energy supply. China will take necessary measures to safeguard its own energy security.”

10 March: Zhai Jun visits the UAE, meeting Deputy PM and FM Abdullah bin Zayed. Abdullah expresses “gratitude for China’s adherence to a just position” and “welcomes the Chinese special envoy’s shuttle diplomacy.” Zhai Jun states that “regional war and chaos do not serve the interests of any party, and achieving a ceasefire is the fundamental way out.” Also meets UAE Presidential Special Envoy for Chinese Affairs Khaldoon Al Mubarak (خلدون المبارك) to discuss bilateral relations.

10 March: Wang Yi speaks by phone with Qatari PM and FM Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani (محمد بن عبد الرحمن آل ثاني), who states that “Qatar had no choice but to conduct necessary self-defense while intensifying diplomatic efforts.” Wang Yi states that “continued war brings nothing but harm” (有百害而无一利) and “supports Gulf countries in taking control of the region’s future and destiny.”

10 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Guo Jiakun reports over 10,000 Chinese travelers safely repatriated from the UAE, Oman, Saudi Arabia and other countries. On Saudi Eastern TV’s question about whether Iranian attacks on Saudi oil facilities would affect the Beijing-brokered Saudi-Iran reconciliation: The Saudi-Iran reconciliation is hard-won and precious, is a common strategic asset of all regional countries, and is worthy of being doubly cherished.” Pressed by Anadolu Agency on whether China’s mediation extends to the US and Israel, Guo Jiakun confirms Wang Yi’s call with Israel’s FM but deflects on US engagement. On Trump’s statement that he has “other candidates in mind” to replace Mojtaba Khamenei: “Electing a new Supreme Leader is a decision made by Iran based on its constitution. Non-interference in internal affairs is a basic norm of international relations.”

11 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Guo Jiakun delivers the most comprehensive summary of China’s position to date, drawing from Wang Yi‘s latest round of calls with Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, and Qatar. States: “From the first day of the outbreak of warfare, China has clearly called for ceasefire and cessation of war (停火止战)… As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a sincere friend of Mideast countries, China’s steps in working for peace will not stop, and its voice in defending fairness and justice will not cease.” On the US transferring Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) components from South Korea to the Mideast: “China’s opposition to US deployment of THAAD in South Korea has not changed.”

11 March: At the UN Security Council, Permanent Representative Fu Cong delivers an explanatory statement after a Russian-proposed ceasefire resolution fails to pass. States he is “disappointed and regretful that the draft resolution was not adopted.” Reiterates: “This is a war that should never have happened, and a war that benefits no party” (这是一场本不应发生的战争,也是一场对各方都没有好处的战争).

11 March: Fu Cong delivers a second explanatory statement after China abstains on a Bahrain-sponsored resolution (on behalf of GCC countries and Jordan): While China “fully understands the major concerns of Gulf Arab states” and “strongly urges the warring parties to genuinely respect the sovereignty and security of non-belligerent states,” the draft “failed to comprehensively and in a balanced manner reflect the root causes and full picture of the conflict.” Articulates a notable distinction: “The fundamental solution to prevent deterioration of the situation lies in the US and Israel stopping military actions. At the same time… we do not agree with Iran’s attacks on Gulf Arab states and condemn all indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians and non-military targets.”

12 March: Wang Yi speaks by phone with Egyptian FM Badr Abdelatty (بدر عبد العاطي). Wang Yi states that “an immediate ceasefire is the universal consensus of the international community, and all parties should urge the parties concerned to press the ‘stop button’ on military actions as soon as possible” (按下军事行动”停止键”).

12 March: Zhai Jun meets Bahraini FM Al Zayani in Manama. Al Zayani states that “Iran should respond to the calls of the international community and immediately stop attacking Gulf Arab countries, ensuring the safety and smooth flow of international shipping lanes.” Zhai Jun responds that “the red line of protecting civilians in military conflicts cannot be crossed, non-military targets such as energy, economy, and people’s livelihood should not be attacked, maritime safety should not be disturbed, and indiscriminate use of force is unacceptable.”

12 March: At a press briefing, spokesperson Guo Jiakun is asked whether any Chinese-flagged vessels have been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz given Reuters reporting at least 16 ships and tankers hit by Iran since the war began. Deflects. Asked by Bloomberg whether China is sharing intelligence with Iran regarding US military activities: “I am not aware of the situation you mentioned.” On Trump’s planned China visit: “I currently have no information to provide.”

12 March: At the UN Security Council, Permanent Representative Fu Cong supports Russia’s procedural motion opposing a briefing by the Iran Sanctions Committee (the “1737 Committee”), arguing that the E3’s “snapback” mechanism has “procedural and legal flaws” and that Resolution 2231 “expired and terminated on October 18 last year.” States that “the rotating presidency’s insistence on holding this meeting will exacerbate contradictions and confrontation among all parties and undermine the prospects for a political settlement of the Iran nuclear issue.”

12 March: After the procedural motion fails, Fu Cong delivers a four-point statement at the Iran Sanctions Committee briefing. Condemns the US as “the instigator of the Iranian nuclear crisis” (伊核危机的始作俑者), noting that it was the US that “unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear comprehensive agreement” and “twice brazenly used military force against Iran during negotiation processes,” causing “diplomatic efforts to come to nothing.” Demands the US “make a clear commitment not to use force again.” States that “relevant European countries should stop adding fuel to the fire” (停止拱火浇油). Cites the IAEA Director-General’s finding that “there is no evidence that Iran plans to manufacture nuclear weapons” and argues that comprehensive safeguards supervision “can fully ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.”

15 March: Zhai Jun meets Kuwaiti FM Sheikh Jarrah Al-Sabah in Kuwait City. Jarrah states that “Iran should immediately stop attacks on Gulf neighbors including Kuwait, ensure the safety and smooth passage of international shipping lanes, and avoid causing greater impact on global energy supply.” Zhai Jun reiterates that “the US and Israel launched military strikes against Iran without UN Security Council authorization, which clearly violates international law” and that “GCC countries’ sovereignty, security and territorial integrity should be fully respected, energy and economic non-military targets should not be attacked, and shipping lane safety should not be disrupted.” Calls on the international community to “urge the parties concerned to immediately cease actions” (敦促当事方立即收手).

15 March: Zhai Jun speaks by phone with Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Mohammed Al-Khulaifi (محمد بن عبدالعزيز الخليفي). Al-Khulaifi states that “the current crisis has caused significant losses to Qatar and has also severely impacted international energy supply and economic development.” Zhai Jun responds that “the key is to translate consensus into action” (关键是要将共识转化为行动) and that “all responsible countries should work separately to prevent escalation and avoid the situation becoming irretrievable.” Praises Qatar’s “important mediating role” in regional affairs.

15 March: Ambassador to Iran Cong Peiwu (丛培武) attends a handover ceremony at the Chinese Embassy in Tehran for USD 200,000 in emergency humanitarian aid from the Chinese Red Cross to the Iranian Red Crescent Society, designated specifically for the families of teachers and students killed at Shajareh Tayebeh Elementary School. Cong Peiwu states that “attacks on schools and harm to children seriously violate international humanitarian law” and quotes Wang Yi: China is willing to work with Mideast countries to “restore order to the Mideast, bring peace to the people, and bring peace to the world” (还中东以秩序,还人民以安宁,还世界以和平).

16 March: At a press briefing,spokesperson Lin Jian (林剑) is asked about Trump’s proposal to form a Strait of Hormuz escort coalition with seven countries, including a social media post calling on China, France, Japan, South Korea, and the UK to dispatch naval vessels. Lin Jian deflects: “China once again calls on all parties to immediately cease military actions.” Pressed multiple times by Anadolu Agency and Al Arabiya on whether the US has formally requested Chinese participation, Lin Jian does not confirm or deny, saying only that “we maintain communication with all parties on the current situation, committed to promoting de-escalation.” ” On reports that the Iran conflict is severely depleting China’s strategic petroleum reserves: redirects to “competent departments.”

16 March: Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chang Hua (常华) visits overseas Chinese representatives amid escalating regional tensions, urging heightened security awareness and quoting Wang Yi: “The world before you is full of chaos, but the motherland behind you is as stable as Mount Tai.” (你面前的世界乱象丛生,你身后的祖国稳如泰山!)

17 March: At a press briefing, Lin Jian addresses reports that Trump is seeking to postpone his China visit by approximately one month due to the Iran war. Notes that “the US side has publicly clarified the inaccurate media reports, stating that the relevant reports are completely wrong.” When Bloomberg presses that Trump himself stated the postponement request, Lin Jian says only: “The Chinese and US sides maintain communication regarding President Trump’s visit to China.” Announces that China has decided to provide emergency humanitarian aid to Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, citing the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assessment that the crisis constitutes a “major humanitarian emergency” with 25 million refugees, approximately 800,000 displaced in Lebanon, and massive civilian casualties in Iran.

Palestine and the Mideast in China’s Vision of Global Governance

At the Two Sessions press conference on 8 March, FM Wang Yi addressed the Palestinian issue, stating that “turmoil and war are not the destiny of the Palestinian people.” He affirmed that “there is only one widely recognized and reasonable solution to the Palestinian issue, which is the two-state solution,” and warned that “the international community cannot accept the Palestinian issue being marginalized again.” Wang Yi called on the United Nations to play a leading role, and pledged that “like people in other parts of the world, Palestine has the legitimate right to be free from war and to peaceful development. As a responsible major power, China will, as always, support the just cause of Palestine’s struggle for its legitimate national rights and push the international community to give the Palestinian people justice.”

On 2 March, Jia Guide addressed the 61st session of the UN Human Rights Council, calling for joint reform of global human rights governance. He noted that “the current Mideast situation is particularly concerning” and called on all parties to “defend the multilateral system with the UN at its core” and to “balance the promotion of the UN’s three pillars of peace and security, development, and human rights.”

Separately, on 3 March, Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Geneva Jia Guide (贾桂德) met with Palestinian Permanent Observer Ibrahim Khraishi (إبراهيم خريشة), reaffirming China’s commitment to the two-state solution and pledging to continue to speak up for justice and uphold fairness for Palestine on multilateral platforms.” Khraishi expressed appreciation for China’s “long-term support” and called for China to play “a more important role in global governance.”

II. Diplomatic Activity Log

The following tables capture bilateral and routine diplomatic engagements between Chinese and Mideastern or Mideast-based officials, organized by region.

1. Perso-Arabian Gulf

Date 🇨🇳 Summary
28 Feb 🇾🇪
Chargé d’Affaires to Yemen Shao Zheng (邵峥) meets Deputy Minister of Youth and Sports Saleh Al-Faqih (صالح أحمد الفقيه); both sides discuss youth and sports exchanges on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of China-Yemen diplomatic relations.
3 Mar 🇮🇷
Ambassador to Azerbaijan Lu Mei (鲁梅) visits Chinese citizens evacuated from Iran upon their arrival in Baku for the Lantern Festival. The embassy serves hot tangyuan; Lu states “China’s diplomacy is the people’s diplomacy” (中国的外交是人民的外交).
4 Mar 🇾🇪
Chargé d’Affaires Shao Zheng meets Renaissance Movement Chairman Ali Al-Bakali (علي البكالي) in Riyadh; Shao highlights the 70th anniversary of China-Yemen relations. Al-Bakali praises China’s “objective and fair position” on Yemen.
7 Mar 🇦🇪
Ambassador to the UAE Zeng Jixin (曾继新) arrives as the 12th Chinese Ambassador, stating relations are “at their best period in history” and that “the motherland is concerned about every compatriot” amid the evolving regional situation.
7 Mar 🇦🇪
Ambassador Zeng Jixin and Consul General in Dubai Ou Boqian (欧渤芩) see off compatriots at Dubai International Airport on the first additional repatriation flight; Zeng states the government is “urgently coordinating more flights to repatriate Chinese citizens stranded in Middle Eastern countries.”
8 Mar 🇰🇼
Ambassador to Kuwait Yang Xin (杨欣) holds three meetings (1, 4, and 8 March) with Assistant FM for Asian Affairs Sameeh Hayat (سميح عيسى جوهر حيات) on regional tensions and safety of Chinese nationals. Yang urges protection of Chinese personnel and facilitation of stranded citizens’ departure. Hayat warns that “spillover and spread of warfare is worrying” (战火外溢蔓延令人担忧) and praises China’s stabilizing role.
9 Mar 🇧🇭
Permanent Representative to UN Geneva Jia Guide (贾桂德) meets Bahrain Permanent Representative Abdullah; both sides discuss the China-Bahrain comprehensive strategic partnership and commit to “jointly defend multilateralism” on the Geneva platform.
10 Mar 🇾🇪
Chargé d’Affaires Shao Zheng holds a video call with newly appointed Minister of Planning Afrah Al-Zouba (أفراح الزوبع), pledging continued humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Al-Zouba hopes to “leave more Chinese marks in Yemen that benefit the local people” (留下更多惠及当地百姓的中国印记).
10 Mar 🇦🇪
Three days after arrival, Ambassador Zeng Jixin presents credentials to Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Omar Al-Shamsi (عمر عبيد الحصان الشامسي), calling China-UAE relations under Xi Jinping and President Mohammed “a model for China’s relations with Arab countries.”
11 Mar 🇮🇶
Ambassador to Iraq Cui Wei (崔巍) meets PM Al-Sudani (محمد شياع السوداني) to thank Iraq for facilitating Chinese citizen evacuations and discuss safety of Chinese enterprises and personnel.
12 Mar 🇾🇪
Chargé d’Affaires Shao Zheng publishes an article in Yemeni media on the Two Sessions, the 15th Five-Year Plan, and “new-quality productive forces,” noting China-Yemen cooperation on the 70th anniversary of relations.
12 Mar 🇾🇪
Chargé d’Affaires Shao Zheng meets Saba TV Director Khaled Ulayan (خالد العليان) in Riyadh; outlines China’s efforts to cool regional tensions and proposes deepened media exchanges.
13 Mar 🇾🇪🇩🇪
Chargé d’Affaires Shao Zheng meets German Ambassador to Yemen Thomas Schneider in Riyadh; Schneider hopes for rapid de-escalation and proposes strengthened China-Germany coordination on regional hotspots.

2. Greater Levant

Date 🇨🇳 Summary
1 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador to Jordan Guo Wei (郭伟) meets Royal Film Commission DG Mohannad Al-Bakri (مهند البكري); notes the successful Chinese Film Festival in Amman and mutual institutional visits. Al-Bakri invites Chinese films to shoot on location in Jordan.
1 Mar🇯🇴🇵🇰
Ambassador Guo Wei meets Pakistani Ambassador Khurram Sarfaraz Khan (خرم سرفراز خان); both sides affirm mutual support on core interests and world peace and stability.
2 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets Al-Ghad Editor-in-Chief Makram Al-Tarawneh (مكرم أحمد الطراونة); praises the outlet’s objective China reporting and proposes deeper media cooperation. Al-Tarawneh pledges to enhance Jordanian public understanding of China.
4 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets Queen Rania Foundation CEO Bassam Sa’ad (بسام سعد); praises the foundation’s children’s education work and proposes cooperation on public welfare education.
4 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets Arab Institute for Security Studies Director Ayman Khalil (أيمن خليل); calls for “serious, professional, and constructive” think tank research in a world of “intertwining changes and turbulence” (变乱交织). Khalil praises China’s role in Mideast stability.
5 Mar🇯🇴🇹🇭
Ambassador Guo Wei congratulates Thai Ambassador Jiraporn Jirampaikool on his new post; highlights favorable prospects for China-Jordan and Thailand-Jordan relations under Jordan’s “Look East” trend.
5 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets FAO Representative Nabil Assaf (نبيل عساف); proposes cooperation on regional livelihood. Assaf hopes to leverage China’s experience for Jordan’s poverty reduction and sustainable development goals.
6 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets House Economic Committee Chairman Khaled Abu Hassan (خالد أبو حسان); notes alignment between Jordan’s Economic Modernization Vision (Phase 2) and China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, offering “broad space” (广阔空间) for practical cooperation.
8 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets former FM Marwan Muasher (مروان المعشر); acknowledges his contributions to bilateral relations. Muasher praises China’s “consistent stance of upholding justice” (一贯秉持正义立场) in international and regional affairs.
9 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets JRTV Chairman Ghaith Tarawneh (غيث الطراونة); proposes expanding cooperation in news communication and program production.
10 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets Agriculture Minister Saeb Khraisat (صائب الخريسات); Khraisat highlights prospects in food processing, smart agriculture, and water-saving irrigation.
10 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei publishes “Returning Peace to the Middle East” in Al-Nabataean, Life News Network, and Pulse News Network, outlining five principles: sovereignty, non-use of force, non-interference, political resolution, constructive great-power conduct.
10 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei and Princess Dana Firas (دانا فراس) discuss cultural heritage protection, noting the depth of both civilizations and prospects for mutual learning.
10 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets Senate Media Committee Chairman Mohammad Dawoudia (محمد الداودية); outlines five principles for handling regional tensions. Dawoudia praises China’s peace efforts and calls for a greater Chinese role.
11 Mar🇯🇴
Embassy convenes a security operations meeting with Chinese enterprises, Confucius Institutes, and government-sponsored students, redeploying safety measures amid regional tensions.
13 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei attends a Ramadan meal distribution co-organized with the Um Ali Foundation; highlights China’s elimination of absolute poverty and growing Chinese enterprise participation in Jordanian social welfare.
15 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei gives an exclusive interview to JNN Editor-in-Chief Jumana Ghneimat (جمانة غنيمات) on the Two Sessions; notes alignment between the 15th Five-Year Plan and Jordan’s Economic Modernization Vision.
16 Mar🇯🇴
Ambassador Guo Wei meets Al-Ra’i Editor-in-Chief Khalid Al-Shoghran (خالد الشقران); praises the newspaper’s China reporting. Al-Shoghran expresses interest in China’s digital media transformation. Guo Wei tours the digital production center.

3. North and Northeast Africa

Date 🇨🇳 Summary
1 Mar🇱🇾
Ambassador to Libya Ma Xuliang (马旭亮) meets Libya-China Steering Committee Chairman Abdul Majeed Mlegta (عبد المجيد مليقطة); praises the committee’s establishment and proposes close exchanges to advance the strategic partnership. Mlegta welcomes Ma’s new posting.
2 Mar🇲🇦
Ambassador to Morocco Yu Jinsong (余劲松) gives a written interview to Médias24 marking the 10th anniversary of the China-Morocco strategic partnership; highlights Chinese investment exceeding $10bn across industrial parks, automotive, and new energy, including Tangier Tech City and Gotion High-tech’s super factory.
4 Mar🇲🇦
Ambassador Yu Jinsong attends a Ramadan donation in Khemisset Province with the Ababou Foundation, distributing aid to 200 families. Notes the 10th anniversary of the China-Morocco strategic partnership and the “China-Africa Year of Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges.”
8 Mar🇱🇾
Ambassador Ma Xuliang meets UNDP Representative Sofia Kemkhadze, who welcomes the resumption of Chinese embassy operations in Libya and praises China’s role in South-South cooperation.
10 Mar🇲🇦
Ambassador Yu Jinsong meets ICESCO DG Salim Al-Malik (سالم بن محمد المالك); both discuss implementing the Global Civilization Initiative. Al-Malik endorses the initiative and appreciates China’s peace contributions.
11 Mar🇩🇿
Ambassador to Algeria Dong Guangli (董广利) meets Public Works Minister Abdelkader Djellaoui (عبد القادر جلاوي); both review cooperation in highways, railways, and ports and agree to advance key projects for “high-quality Belt and Road construction.”
11 Mar🇩🇿
Ambassador Dong Guangli briefs Voice of the People Party Chairman Lamine Osmani (لمين عصماني) and senior party officials on the Two Sessions and zero-tariff policy. Describes the China-Algeria framework as spanning “from space to underground” (上天入地). Osmani shares impressions from a recent China visit.
12 Mar🇲🇦
Ambassador Yu Jinsong publishes “Give Peace a Chance, Restore Tranquility to the Middle East” (给和平以机会,还中东以安宁) on Medi1 TV’s website, elaborating Wang Yi’s five principles and calling to “replace confrontation with dialogue, coercion with consultation.”
12 Mar🇱🇾🇫🇷
Ambassador Ma Xuliang meets French Ambassador Thierry Vallat; introduces Wang Yi’s “five basic principles”, which Vallat “highly praises.” Both commit to coordinating on Libya’s UN-led political process.
13 Mar🇿🇦
CG Pan Qingjiang (潘庆江) holds pre-visit discussions with a delegation led by Gauteng Speaker Morakane Mosupyoe ahead of their China trip; covers bilateral relations and Mideast issues.
15 Mar🇩🇿
Ambassador Dong Guangli gives an El Moudjahid interview on the zero-tariff policy for 53 African countries (effective 1 May 2026); highlights benefits for Algerian dates, citrus, olive oil, and energy exports via the CADEPA framework.
15 Mar🇩🇿
At a Ramadan scholar-media symposium themed “To Walk with China Is to Walk with Opportunities,” Ambassador Dong Guangli characterizes the zero-tariff policy as “subtraction on tariffs, addition on development, multiplication on livelihoods, and division on tariff abuse” (关税的“减法”、发展的“加法”、民生的“乘法”、滥施关税的“除法”). Highlights an Algerian satellite launched from Jiuquan and Africa’s first desert heavy-haul railway built with Chinese participation.
15 Mar🇱🇾
Ambassador Ma Xuliang meets Libya Chamber Federation Chairman Mohamed Raeid (محمد رائد); highlights the upcoming zero-tariff policy. Raeid expresses confidence it will boost Libyan exports to China.

This edition of the Sino-Arabica Policy Monitor was prepared by Raphael Angieri with contributions from Margaret Wu.


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